Russia’s star is waxing while America’s wanes. Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 3, russian foreign policy on middle east in Istanbul, Turkey.
Putin has travelled to Turkey for a meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister that is expected to include talks regarding the conflict in neighbouring Syria. Even before Russian bombers launched strikes into Syria from an Iranian air base last month, it was clear that one of President Barack Obama’s more dubious foreign policy legacies would be the resurrection of Moscow’s great power status in the Middle East. Lacking a significant military footprint in the region since being unceremoniously expelled from Egypt in 1972, the Russians are back with a vengeance, potentially bigger than ever. Across the eastern Mediterranean and Levant, through Turkey, Iran, and the broader Gulf region, the trend line is obvious to anyone with eyes to see it: Russia’s star is waxing while America’s wanes.
In strategic theaters where successive generations of U. American military dominance is essential, a resurgent Russia increasingly poses challenges. Slowly but surely, Washington’s freedom of action is being constricted. And as sure as night follows day, Russia’s successful flexing of military power has led to the rapid expansion of its political clout as well. And not just among America’s adversaries.
Syria, of course, is the Obama administration’s original sin in this regard: the hesitancy, the empty ultimatums, the erased red lines, the lack of anything approaching a serious strategy to contain that conflict’s steady, predictable descent into hell. All that and more over the course of four and a half long years amounted to a flashing neon sign declaring the abdication of U. Obama insisted that Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad must go. Needless to say, Asad is staying.
In the face of Obama’s endless tut-tutting about the disutility of military force to shape political outcomes in the Middle East, Putin deployed force and in a matter of months transformed Syria’s political landscape. As for the impact of Russia’s intervention on U. Obama administration has been pretty clear. It wanted no part of any action to weaken the Asad regime that might risk tangling with the Russians. While the United States once enjoyed near-total domination of the skies over Syria and the broader eastern Mediterranean, it was clearly now constrained heavily, forced to alter its operational patterns to deconflict with Russia’s growing presence.
The changes wrought by Russia’s intervention are no passing phenomenon linked to the Syria crisis. They appear to represent a more permanent shift in the geostrategic realities of the eastern Mediterranean. Whether or not the immediate conflict gets settled, the new Russian airbase in Latakia, Syria, is almost certainly here to stay. Recent Russian bombing raids from an air base in Iran raise the specter that Moscow’s growing military role, bad enough in the case of the eastern Mediterranean, could expand to the Gulf region as well, a theater of perhaps even greater strategic consequence for the United States. True, the immediate grounds for the use of the base were relatively narrow, restricted to the joint Russian-Iranian interest in bolstering the Asad regime. But no one should take much solace from the temporary hiccup. There may indeed be powerful constraints acting to limit military cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, including Iranian nationalism and centuries of Persian-Russian rivalry and suspicion.
But it is also increasingly clear that there are powerful forces at work pushing the two countries in the direction of unprecedented cooperation. Should it come to pass, the persistent presence in Iran of Russian aircraft, personnel, and potentially air defense systems would have profound implications for the United States and its allies. Most obviously, as in Syria, it would dramatically enhance Iran’s deterrence posture against American or Israeli military action. In defending the Iranian nuclear deal, Obama has argued that the risks are acceptable because his successors will have at their disposal exactly the same options that exist today to prevent any Iranian dash to the bomb, including the use of force. More broadly, an expanded Russian military role in Iran would give Moscow the capability to project power in ways never before seen in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Indian Ocean — critical lines of communication where U. A world where long-range Russian bombers and aircraft are suddenly in position to disrupt or challenge guaranteed U.
Just put yourself in the shoes of a Saudi policymaker, for example. Russia, embarks on a large-scale military intervention against U. Syria, working hand in glove with a Shiite coalition commanded by the head of the Iran’s Qods Force, Qassem Soleimani. Putin almost certainly has his sights set on exploiting other opportunities for projecting Russian power in the region as well.
Russia is paying more attention to the Yemen issue too. Iraq is almost certainly on Putin’s radar, too. Shortly after Russia’s intervention in Syria, Moscow said that it had entered a quadripartite intelligence-sharing agreement with Iran, Syria, and Iraq, for purposes of fighting the Islamic State. It includes a coordination center in Baghdad, staffed by officers from the four countries. Finally, even Turkey merits concern when it comes to Russia’s expanding ambitions. Turkish relations have been on a downward trajectory for years, but especially since the July 15th aborted coup against the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. At the same time, Turkey’s relations with Russia have been on an upswing since June, when Erdogan issued an apology for the 2015 Turkish shoot-down of a Russian jet over Syria.
One other related development worth noting: As Turkey was pursuing reconciliation with Russia, Turkish ties to Iran also intensified, with the Turkish and Iranian foreign ministers exchanging visits in August, and plans for an Erdogan visit to Tehran allegedly in the works for later in 2016. Let’s stipulate upfront that the odds of Turkey definitively switching sides from the United States to Russia are slim. After more than 60 years of NATO membership, Turkey’s security dependence on the U. Western alliance is deep and would be extremely difficult to replace.
Moreover, Turkey’s long history with Russia is at least as troubled and suspicion-filled as Iran’s, including several lost wars. Yet within limits, there’s still certainly plenty of running room for Putin to make a lot of mischief for the United States in Turkey. As analysts have noted, there are rising voices in Ankara calling for the country’s withdrawal from NATO in favor of an alliance with Russia. Exactly how far Russia’s resurgence in the Middle East will ultimately go remains to be seen, as do the potential strategic ramifications for U. But no one should be sanguine. The trend lines are all troubling. Thanks to the Obama administration’s retreat from regional leadership, things that seemed unthinkable five years ago are now entirely possible — from a large and permanent Russian military presence in the eastern Mediterranean to a rapidly evolving Russian strategic relationship with Iran in the Gulf.
